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The Incident of Suvivorship in Ohio
ARTHUR T. MARTIN*
Frequently individuals wish to have tide to property so
divided between two or more persons that on the death of one
of them the entire ownership will be vested automatically in
the survivors. Situations in which this desire is commonly
manifested are where the husband and wife buy a home or make
some other permanent investment of a substantial character;
where persons have a joint bank account; or where property
is left in trust with co-trustees. In most jurisdictions the estate
by entireties or of joint tenancy is an appropriate device for the
accomplishment of the desired objective, but in Ohio there is
doubt as to the availability of these devices. The assertion that
there is no joint tenancy in Ohio has been made so often that
the courts feel constrained to deny the existence of any estate
with an incident of survivorship. Yet they frequently reach
conclusions not only consistent with such an estate but best
explained on an assumption of its existence.
IN GENERAL
The estate of joint tenancy has been known to the common
law for many centuries. Its history can be traced back to the
thirteenth century Littleton indicates that this estate had
taken definite form distinguishing it from other forms of con-
current ownership by the fifteenth century. Its outstanding
characteristic has always been the jus accressendi or right of
survivorship.! By force of this incident, on the death of one of
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
A cotenancy for the lives of the co-owners with remainder to the sur-
vivor might also be used in some situations but this device would not occur
to most laymen and many lawyers. This device is in many respects quite
different from a joint tenancy as is pointed out at page 64 infra.
2 Bracton, De Legibus, (Twiss ed. 1878) Sec. 13.
3 Littleton, Tenures (Wimbaugh ed. 1903), Secs. 277-291.
4 The phrases "incident of survivorship" and "right of survivorship" are
used synonymously.
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the joint tenants his share belongs to the surviving tenants
instead of passing to the heirs or devisees of the deceased tenant
as would be the case on the death of a tenant in common. The
incident of survivorship is a result of the theory of unity of
ownership of the joint tenants. This theory indulges in the
fiction that all the joint tenants together constitute but one
owner and consequently the fictitious single ownership con-
tinues in spite of the death of a tenant.*
During the feudal period it was seen that an estate with an
incident of survivorship could be used by a tenant to avoid the
burdensome feudal incidents of wardship and relief.' This
could be done by making a conveyance of the tenant's estate to
several men, usually much younger than the particular tenant,
who would agree to hold the property in trust for the grantor
during his life and for his heir after his death. The chancery
court would enforce the trust and on the death of the tenant
the overlord would not be entitled to a relief or wardship of
the minor heir because legal title was in the trustees. Although
the overlord would theoretically have similar rights against the
survivor of the trustees, ordinarily the last survivor of the
young men selected as trustees would live until the tenant's
heir became of age. The legal title would then be conveyed to
the heir by the trustees. The transaction resulted in the pay-
ment of two fines from the tenant's estate for the two convey-
ances but it saved the tenant's heir from the much more onerous
feudal incidents of wardship and relief.
Because of the advantages it offered a tenant in avoiding
feudal incidents, the estate of joint tenancy was favored by the
early common law courts. As a matter of construction a court
would tend to find a joint tenancy whenever a conveyance was
made to two or more persons unless the language of the con-
veyance indicated that some estate other than joint tenancy was
contemplated. After the breakdown of the feudal system the
5 Blackstone, Commentaries (Lewis ed. 1902) vol. I, 179-195); Tif-
fany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) vol. I, sec. 190.
0 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (923) vol. II, p. 20.
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reason for this preference was gone and survivorship was
frowned upon as making no provision for posterity. The con-
struction preferred since that time has been against joint tenancy
and in favor of tenancy in common."
Although it is a characteristic of the estate of joint tenancy
that the ownership of the estate will pass to the surviving joint
tenant, it has always been possible for any joint tenant to sev-.r
the joint tenancy as to his proportionate interest by a convey-
ance inter vivos. The grantee would then take the grantor's
share as a tenant in common without any incident of survivor-
ship.8
At common law a conveyance to a husband and wife was
regarded as creating a tenancy by entireties rather than a joint
tenancy. The tenancy by entireties also has the incident of sur-
vivorship. The unique qualities which distinguish this estate
from the joint tenancy are the requirement that the tenants be
husband and wife, and the inability of a tenant to defeat the
incident of survivorship by a conveyance.9 Estates by entireties
were an outgrowth of the common law concept of husband and
wife as a single entity and it may well be questioned whether
according to present day standards there should be greater sta-
bility to the incident of survivorship where the cotenants are
husband and wife than there is where the cotenants are not
married to each other. While the estate has been repudiated in
many jurisdictions in others it is regarded as still existing, un-
affected by the "Married Women's Property Acts" or even by
statutes which modify the ordinary joint tenancy."
In most of the states there are statutes with reference to
joint tenancies. Many of these statutes simply state a prefer-
ence as a matter of construction in favor of a tenancy in common
7 Tiffany, op. cit., p. 63I; 23 Harv. L. Rev. 214 (1910).
8 Littleton, op. cit. sec. 292; Blackstone, op. cit. pp. I8 5-I86; Tiffany,
op. cit. p. 637.
" In general on tenancies by entireties see Tiffany, op. cit., sec. i94;
Thompson, Real Property (1924) vol. II, Sec, 1735-1765.
10 Brewster Conveyancing (1904) secs. 163-165; Tiffany, Real Prop-
erty (2d ed. 1920) vol. II, pp. 65o-651.
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as against a joint tenancy but in some states the statutes sub-
stantially abolish the estate of joint tenancy. Under either
type of statute conveyances to co-trustees are commonly ex-
cepted, and under statutes creating a presumption in favor of
tenancies in common, conveyances to husband and wife are also
sometimes excepted.'
TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES
In Ohio the tenancy by entireties has never been recognized
as an estate distinct from that of joint tenancy." Sergeant v.
Steinberger" was the first case involving the problem of sur-
vivorship to reach the Ohio Supreme Court. The property in
litigation was owned concurrently by a husband and wife. In
denying the existence of an incident of survivorship the court
assumed it was denying the existence of the estate of joint
tenancy. In subsequent cases there has been a similar failure to
distinguish between joint tenancy and tenancy by entireties,
"'The following statutes raise a presumption in favor of a tenancy in
common but except conveyances to co-trustees from this presumption; Dela-
ware, Revised Code (1915) Sec. 3270; District of Columbia, Code (1929)
Title 25, Sec. 276; Indiana, Stat. Ann. (1933) vol. II, Sec. 56-111 and Sec.
56-112; Maine, Revised Stat. (1930) Sec. 13, p. 1233 and Sec. 19, p. 1234;
Michigan Comp. Laws (1929) Secs. 12964 and I2965; Minnesota, Mason's
Statutes (927) Sec. 8074; Missouri, Stat. Ann. (93 Z) Vol. III, Sec.
3114; Mississippi, Hemingway's Code (1927) Sec. 2429; Montana, Revised
Code (1921) Sec. 6680; North Dakota, Compiled Laws (I913 Sec. 5262;
South Dakota, Compiled Laws (I929) Sec. 269; Vermont Gen. Laws (917)
Sec. 2728. Conveyances to husband and wife are also excepted in the Ari-
zona, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Vermont statutes.
The following statutes abolish joint tenancies or the right of survivor-
ship: Alabama, Code (1928) Sec. 6924; South Carolina, Code (1932) Sec.
891i; Tennessee, Williams' Code (1934) Sec. 7604; Washington, Reming-
ton's Revised Statutes (932) Sec. 1344; but in the following statutes con-
veyances to trustees are excepted: North Carolina Code (1931) Secs. 1735
and 1736; Oregon, Code (930) Vol. III, Sees. 63-207 and 63-209;
Pennsylvania, Purdon's Statutes (1936) Title 20, Sec. 12i; Virginia, Code
(1930) Sees. 5159 and 516o. For a more complete enumeration of statutes
as of 1924 see Thompson, Real Property (924) Vol. II, Secs. 172o and
1721.
"Ibid, Sec. 1721; See Tax Comm. v. Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 361 at
367 (929); Gleason v. Syuires, 34 Ohio L.Rep. 432, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 729
( 93i)813 2 Ohio 305, 15 Am. Dec. 553 (1826).
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the uniform assumption being that the problem of survivorship
as an incident of an estate is presented only by the estate of joint
tenancy." Inasmuch as the tenancy by entireties owed its dis-
tinctive qualities to the common law fiction of the oneness of
husband and wife it would seem that the abrogation of that
fiction should result in a refusal to recognize the distinctive
qualities of the tenancy by entireties. Under the Ohio statutes
a husband and wife are clearly separate entities.1" This fact
coupled with the failure of the Ohio courts to mention estates
by entireties where the cotenants are husband and wife would
seem to justify the conclusion that there is no such estate in
Ohio. Consequently the question of the existence of an incident
of survivorship would seem to be primarily a problem of recog-
nition of joint tenancies, whether the cotenants are husband and
wife or parties not married to each other.
JOINT TENANCY BETWEEN Co-TRUSTEES
It is very advantageous for co-trustees to hold by an estate
which has an incident of survivorship so that the administration
of the trust will not be impeded by title complications on the
death of a trustee. By this device the practical abeyance of tide
may be avoided during the probate proceedings for the estate
of the deceased trustee. The statutes in many jurisdictions
abrogating the estate of joint tenancy or changing the presump-
tion of co-ownership from one favoring joint tenancy to one
favoring tenancy in common except conveyances to co-trustees.1 6
Ohio has never had any such statute dealing with the general
recognition of joint estates. The rule of non-recognition has
been judicially developed and the Ohio Supreme Court has not
admitted making an exception to the rule in the case of co-
trustees.
'14 Lewis v. Baldwin, ii Ohio 352 (1842); Wilson & Marsh v. Flem-
ing et al, 13 Ohio 68 (1844); Penn v. Cox, 16 Ohio 30 (1847); Farmers,
& Merchants National Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152, I2 N.E. 439
(1887).
15 Gen. Code, Secs. 7995-8004.
1 8Supra n. ii.
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In 1840 in the case of Miles v. Fisher,'" a devise was made
in what seems to have been a perpetual trust to three trustees
"as joint tenants and not as tenants in common." One of the
trustees died and an heir of the settlor brought ejectment. The
court refused to allow the plaintiff's action but it asserted that
there is no joint tenancy in Ohio. In support of its holding
against the plaintiff's action the court propounded a theory that
each trustee took an estate for life in an undivided one-third of
the property granted to each of the other trustees. This theory
seems to have had no foundation in the language of the testator
but it enabled the court to permit the trust to continue undis-
turbed through the life of the survivor of the trustees. The
court's assumption that trustees in a perpetual trust take only
life estates in the absence of words of inheritance was repudi-
ated in a later case.'" This repudiation destroys the basis of the
artificial theory used by the court to find a passing of the title
to the surviving trustees.
A few years after this decision a statute was passed which
was designed to lessen the inconvenience resulting from co-
trustees not holding as joint tenants. ' The statute provided
that a surviving testamentary trustee should have power to ad-
minister the trust unless the will showed a contrary intent. It
has been assumed that this statute did not make the trustees
joint tenants of the trust property."0 In 1932 this provision was
modified and amplified to read "When two or more fiduciaries
have been appointed jointly to execute a trust, and one or more
of them dies, declines, resigns, or is removed, the title shall pass
to the surviving or remaining fiduciary or fiduciaries who shall
17 io Ohio 1(I840).
" 1illiams v. The First Presbyterian Society in Cincinnati, i Ohio St.
478 (853); see also, Vaughan v. Zitscher, 4 Ohio N.P. N.S. 9o, 17 Ohio
Dec. 184 (I9o6).
V) 50 Ohio L. 309 (852); Gen. Code, Sec. 10,595 prior to 1932;
"When two or more trustees are appointed by will, to execute a trust, and
one or more of them dies, declines, resigns, or are removed, the survivors or
remaining trustees or trustee may execute the trust, unless the terms of the
will express a contrary intention."
' Winder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 93 N.E. io98 (i9io). And
see Sowers v. Cyrenius, 39 Ohio St. 29, 48 Am. Rep. 418 (1883).
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execute the trust, unless the creating instrument expresses a
contrary intention or unless the court on the application of one
or more of the beneficiaries or other persons interested in the
trust so determines .... *"" This provision seems to permit a
joint tenancy between trustees of a testamentary trust. There
is some ambiguity in the language so that it is not entirely dear
whether there is a presumption in favor of a joint tenancy. If
the word "jointly" appearing in the first part of the provision
were omitted it would seem that a presumption in favor of a
joint tenancy would be raised by the clause "unless the creat-
ing instrument expresses a contrary intention." Probably the
word "jointly" was not intended in a technical sense and it
would seem desirable to construe it as meaning "concurrently"
in order to construe the statute as creating a presumption in
favor of a joint tenancy.
There is no express statutory provision for conveyances to
non-testamentary co-trustees but the recognition of the estate
of joint tenancy between such co-trustees is similarly desirable.22
Such recognition may require an exception in favor of co-
trustees to the judicial non-recognition of joint tenancies in
Ohio; or, what is more desirable a repudiation by the courts
of early dicta against the incident of survivorship and a recog-
nition of joint tenancies wherever it is dear that such estates
were intended whether the tenants be co-trustees, husband and
wife, or other parties.
JOINT TENANCY IN REAL PROPERTY
Most of the cases in which the Ohio Supreme Court has
purported to deny the existence of the estate of joint tenancy
have involved conveyances of real property. In these cases a
reason occasionally advanced to justify a refusal to recognize
a joint tenancy is that the jus accrescendi or right of survivor-
21 Gen. Code, Sec. io,5o6-56 (932).
22 Gen. Code, Sec. IO,5O6-56 is limited to situations where two or more
"fiduciaries" are appointed to execute a trust. In Sec. io,5o6-i "fiduciary"
is defined as a person appointed by and accountable to the probate court.
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ship is not founded on principles of natural justice.23 Courts
which have made this statement have failed to give it meaning
by specifically indicating what are the "principles of natural
justice" which survivorship violates. Two more specific if not
more convincing reasons have been advanced occasionally.
These are: the estate is inconsistent with a statute which author-
izes partition by joint tenants; and, the estate is inconsistent
with our system of descent.2"
It has always been within the power of a joint tenant to
defeat the incident of survivorship by an ordinary conveyance
which would make the grantee a tenant in common. It can be
seen that under a statute which permitted partition by tenants
in common a joint tenant could easily bring himself within the
scope of the statute by a conveyance to, and a reconveyance
from, a third person. A statute which gives the power of par-
tition directly to joint tenants and thus obviates the necessity
for a preliminary transaction to convert the joint tenancy into a
tenancy in common, does not seem like such a drastic innovation
as to amount to an abrogation of the estate. A similar statute,
enacted in England in 1539, has not been considered equiva-
lent to a repudiation of the joint estate" and in many states in
this country a statutory power to partition is regarded as en-
tirely consistent with the existence of a joint tenancy.26 On the
23Sergeant v. Steinberger, z Ohio 305, 15 Am. Dec. 553 (1826);
Farmers' & Merchants' National Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152, 12 N.E.
439 (1887); and see Wilson & Marsh v. Fleming, 13 Ohio 68 (1844).
" Reasoning that the estate of joint tenancy is inconsistent with a statute
which authorizes partition by a joint tenant, Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio
305, 15 Am. Dec. 553 (1826); Moore's Lessee v. Armstrong, 1o Ohio II,
36 Am. Dec. 63 (1840); In re Hutchison, izo Ohio St. 54Z, 166 N.E. 687
(1929); Foraker v. Kocks, 41 Ohio App. 210, 36 Ohio L.Rep. 156 (931);
reasoning that the estate of joint tenancy is inconsistent with our system of
descent, Moore's Lessee v. Armstrong, io Ohio II, 36 Am. Dec. 63 (840).
25 31 Ken. VIII c. I, 2, & 3 (1839) ; for a discussion of the statute see
Williams, Real Property, 23d ed. (1920) pp. 149-15I.
2' See for example: Delaware, Revised Code (1915) Sec. 3270 Sec. 3;
Illinois Revised Statutes, Cahill (1929) Ch. io6, Sec. I; Indiana Stat. Ann.
(i933) Vol. II, Sec. 3-2401; Michigan Comp. Laws (19z9) Sec. 14995;
Minnesota, Mason's Statutes (I9z7) Sec. 95-24; Missouri, Stat. Ann. (1932)
Vol. II, Sec. 1545; Montana, Revised Code (x9zI) Sec. 9516. Although a
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other hand authority in accord with the Ohio position as to
the effect of the partition statute seems to be entirely lacking.
The supposed inconsistency between an incident of surviv-
orship and our system of descent has been referred to earlier
as a reason advanced for changing to a presumption in favor of
tenancy in common after the breakdown of the feudal system."
This system of descent does favor the passing of property along
certain prescribed lines to relatives according to the proximity
of relationship. This may justify a preference for tenancy in
common as against joint tenancy as a matter of construction but
it does not seem to be adequate justification for a complete
repudiation of the joint tenancy. Our system of descent is
subject to a property owner's power to make a disposition
inconsistent with the course of descent and to his power to
create certain estates which do not pass by descent. Thus he can
defeat an heir's expectancy by making a gratuitous transfer
to a stranger and he may create estates such as those for life and
at will which do not have the quality of inheritability. This is
true in Ohio as well as in other jurisdictions. No particular
phase of our system of descent has been pointed out as present-
ing a peculiar obstacle to the recognition of an estate with an
incident of survivorship. Inasmuch as many jurisdictions which
recognize the estate of joint tenancy have systems of descent
similar to ours the assertion of inconsistency is not persuasive.28
There are five cases in which the Ohio Supreme Court is
supposed to have held that there is no joint tenancy in real
property in this state. In none of these cases was a denial of
the existence of the estate of joint tenancy necessary to justify
the disposition which the court made of the litigation. In three
of the cases a claim for survivorship was not allowed but the
holding could have been based on a presumption in favor of
former Ohio statute purported to give joint tenants power to partition, 29
Ohio Laws 254, the present partition statute does not mention joint tenants.
Gen. Code Sec. iz,oz6.
27 Supra, p. 49-50.
28 See n. I I supra.
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tenancy in common; in a fourth case wherz a claim for surviv-
orship was not allowed the holding was consistent with a theory
that what had been a joint tenancy in its inception, had been
converted to a tenancy in common by a mortgage by one of
the cotenants;5° in the fifth case a survivorship was permitted
although the court denied that it was allowed on a theory of
joint tenancy."1
The first of these cases was Sergeant v. Steinberger"2 de-
cided in 1826. The case has become a leading authority against
the existence of joint tenancies in Ohio. The controversy in
that case grew out of a devise of a fee simple estate by a testa-
tor to his daughter and her husband. The son-in-law survived
his wife and after his death a dispute as to the ownership of
this property arose between the heirs of the daughter and the
devisees of the son-in-law. The court decided that the daugh-
ter and her husband were tenants in common. The devise did
not contain any language indicating an intent to create an estate
with an incident of survivorship and so the court's conclusion
would have been entirely explainable on the basis of a pre-
sumption in favor of a tenancy in common. There was a similar
lack of evidence of intent to create an estate with the incident
of survivorship in the subsequent cases of Wilson and Marsh v.
Fleming and Penn v. Cox." Although the court in each of
these cases talks in terms of repudiation of the estate of joint
tenancy the actual disposition is consistent with an acceptance
of the estate of joint tenancy with a presumption in favor of
the tenancy in common.
Unlike the cases just discussed, the case of Farmers' and
"I'Sergeant v. Steinlberger, z Ohio 305, 15 Am. Dec. 553 (i8z6); Wil-
son & Marsh v. Fleming, 13 Ohio 68 (I844); Penn v. Cox, 16 Ohio 30
(I847); and see Tabler v. Wiseman, z Ohio St. 2o8 (1853); Thompson v.
Heirs of Dingman, z Ohio Dec. Rep. 711 (1863).
"' Farmers' & Merchants' National Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152,
xz N.E. 439 (1887).
a Lewis v. Baldwin, I I Ohio 352 (1842).
az Ohio 305, 15 Am. Dec. 553 (1826).
a Note 30, supra.
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Merchants' National Bank v. Wallace" involved a conveyance
in which the language indicated an intention to create a joint
tenancy. The controversy was between one of the tenants and
a mortgagee of the other. Both tenants were alive at the time.
The court refused to enjoin a foreclosure by the mortgagee.
It does not appear that foreclosure was attempted on more
than a one-half interest in the premises. It has been held that
a mortgage by a joint tenant, like a conveyance by deed, works
a severance of the joint estate to the extent of the encumbrance,
so that the mortgagee acquires the same type of interest which
he would acquire if the mortgagor were a tenant in common."
Accepting this theory, the result in Farmers' and Merchants'
National Bank v. Wallace is consistent with a recognition of
the estate of joint tenancy although the court assumes that it
is not.
In Sergeant v. Steinberger"6 the court was emphatic in its
denunciation of the incident of survivorship as "not founded
on principles of natural justice" and "contrary to the habits
and feeling of the people of this state." In view of this position
it is interesting that the Supreme Court permitted a survivor-
ship in the first case to come before it in which there was clear
evidence that the grantor intended to create an estate with such
incident. This case was that of Lewis v. Baldwin37 in which
there was a conveyance to a husband and wife "jointly, their
heirs and assigns, and to the survivor of them, his or her sepa-
rate heirs or assigns." After the death of the wife, her heirs
claimed as tenants in common with the husband. The court
found that the property belonged to the husband to the exclu-
sion of his wife's heirs "not on the principle of survivorship
but as grantee in fee as survivor." It is not clear what distinc-
tion the court meant to suggest by these words but apparently
the court intended to take the general position that a survivor-
3445 Ohio St. 152, iz N.E. 439 (1887).
35 Wilkins v. Young, i4 Ind. 1, 55 Am. St. Rep. 16z (1895); and see
Tiffany, Real Property (i92o) 2d ed., Vol. I, pp. 638-639.
36 Supra, n. 32.
37 1x Ohio 352 (584z).
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ship should be permitted when the language of the conveyance
dearly indicates an intention for such an incident. This position
was accepted a few years ago by a common pleas court which
asserted that the early Ohio cases such as Sergeant v. Stein-
berger are not applicable where survivorship is by the act of the
grantor."s This seems to be simply another way of stating the
view generally held in other states that, while there is a pref-
erence for the tenancy in common as a matter of construction,
the estate of joint tenancy will be recognized where the lan-
guage of the conveyance clearly indicates an intention to
create it.
Inasmuch as the disposition of the cases of concurrent own-
ership of real property has been consistent with the existence
of the estate of joint tenancy the courts' opinions repudiating
that estate can be regarded as dicta. If this view is accepted the
decided cases present no serious obstacle to an acceptance of the
general rule of recognition of joint tenancies with a presump-
tion in favor of tenancies in common. Furthermore, there is
not the logical consistency which is expected of courts if a
rule is applied in one case and repudiated in another similar
case. It may well be questioned whether there is a substantial
basis for denying the incident of survivorship in cases of real
property and recognizing it in cases of bank accounts.
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
It has generally been supposed that a joint tenancy can
exist in personal property as well as in real property and at
the present time problems of joint ownership and survivorship
arise most frequently in connection with joint accounts. 9 In
these situations Ohio courts have quite uniformly sustained
the validity of an express provision for survivorship between
" In re Estate of Dennis, 30 Ohio N.P. N.S. I 18 (1928).
" "And as the survivor holds place between joint-tenants, in the same
manner it holdeth place between them which have joint estate or possession
with another of a chattel, real or personal." Littleton, Tenures (Wambaugh
ed. 1903), Sec. 281.
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so-called joint depositors." On the analysis suggested in the
preceding pages this conclusion is consistent with the actual
holding in most of the earlier cases but it is not consistent with
their language. Accordingly it would seem to be desirable for
the courts to repudiate the opinions of those earlier cases or to
distinguish those situations from the joint account situation.
The Supreme Court did neither of these things in the first
case in which the question of survivorship in a joint account
40 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373, 48
A.L.R. 182 (1926); Tax Comm. v. Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N.E.
352 (1929); Yost v. Schmitt, 128 Ohio St. 48, 19o N.E. 403 (934);
Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (935); Osterland v.
Schroeder, 22 Ohio App. 213, 153 N.E. 758 (1926); Union Trust Co. v.
Hutchison, 27 Ohio App. 284, 161 N.E. 222 (1927); In re Estate of
Shangle, 32 Ohio L.Rep. 185, 8 Ohio L.Abs. 621 (1930); Hutchisonv. Union
Trust Co., 26 Ohio N.P. N.S. 499 (1927); Buckeye State B. & L. Co. v.
Fridley, 28 Ohio N.P. N.S. 254 (1930); Pindras v. Cleveland Trust Co.,
33 Ohio L.Rep. 423 (1930); Gorr v. Huss, io Ohio L. Abs. 173 (I931);
In re Vollmer, 30 Ohio N.P. N.S. 289 (933)
, aff'd Vollmer v. Vollmer,
47 Ohio App. 154, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 107 (933); Ryan v. Henney, 20
Ohio L. Abs. 518. Cf. In re Estate of Ellen Morgan, 28 Ohio C.A. 222
(1918). Those cases are to be distinguished in which there are no words
indicating an intention to create a right of survivorship. Bender v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 123 Ohio St. 588, 176 N.E. 472 (1931). In re Estate of Burns,
21 Ohio L. Abs. 148 (1935); Baker v. Dollar Savings and Trust Co., 39
Ohio L.Rep. 659; 15 Ohio L.Abs. 385 (1933).
Also to be distinguished are the cases in which the court finds no effec-
tive delivery of an intent to the non contributing co-owner of an account.
Schmitt v. Schmitt, 39 Ohio App. 219, 28 Ohio L.Rep. 522 (1928); Kinder
v. Nelson, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 425 (1930); Held v. Myers, 48 Ohio App. 131,
16 Ohio L. Abs. 490 (1934). In Bender v. Cleveland Trust Co., 123 Ohio
St. 588 at 593 it is suggested that there is not a similar problem of delivery
in situations where words of survivorship are used. This seems to be a mis-
conception. If the rights of the non contributing party are to be sustained
on a theory of gift, it is as important'to show delivery when he takes as a
tenant in common as it is when he takes as joint tenant with right of survivor-
ship. In either case delivery is necessary to show a transaction sufficient to
create the rights of an owner in the non-contributing party. If his rights
are to be sustained on a theory of donee beneficiary of a contract a showing
of delivery is not necessary in either type of situation. For a discussion of
the theories on which the interest of the non-contributing party can be sup-
ported see: Rowley, Living Testamentary Dispositions, 3 Cinn. L. Rev. 361
at 378-389 (1929); The Ohio Rule on Contracts for the Benefit of a Third
Party, 3 Cinn. L. Rev. 310 (1929); Joint Tenancies in Bank Accounts, 38
Harv. L. Rev. 243 (1925); Deposit in Name of Depositor and Another.
48 A.L.R. 189, 66 A.L.R. 881.
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was presented to it. The case was that of Cleveland Trust Co.
v.Scobie4' decided in 1926, and the only point discussed by the
court was whether the transaction amounted to a present gift
of an interest to the noncontributing co-owner of the account.
The court found a completed gift and held that the noncon-
tributing co-owner, as survivor, was entitled to the balance of
the account. In giving the opinion of the court, Judge Allen
ignored the earlier opinions against the incident of survivor-
ship and assumed that if the court found a gift of a joint inter-
est the incident of survivorship would attach to it. No reason
was offered for the tacit assumption that the problem of recog-
nition of incident of survivorship is different in' cases of real
property from what it is in cases of joint accounts or other
personal property.
Three years later the court held that a succession tax is
leviable against an interest taken by survivorship in a joint
bank account.42 In reaching this conclusion the court asserted
that the co-owners of a bank account are "quasi joint tenants,"
with the right of survivorship. There was no discussion of the
theory on which this right was recognized and the court simply
cited the Scobie case to support its conclusion. The case gives
no indication as to whether the court thought that survivorship
should be recognized in joint tenancies as well as "quasi joint"
tenancies.
About a month later in the case of In re Hutchison43 the
court discussed its recognition of survivorship in a personal
property situation. In this case the controversy was between
the widow of James Hutchison and his executor over the
ownership of certain shares of stock. The shares were evi-
denced by a certificate in which there was the following own-
ership clause: "This is to certify that James Hutchison and
Letitia Hutchison, as tenants in common for their respective
41 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373, 48 A.L.R. I87 (1926).
" Tax Comm. v. Hutchison, 12o Ohio St. 361, i66 N.E. 352 (979);
and sce Tax Comm. v. Reeves, i Ohio L. Abs. 154 (1931).
43 izo Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929).
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lives remainder in whole to their survivor is the owner. . ... )
The money for the purchase of this stock was withdrawn by
James from a joint bank account which he had with his wife.
From the statement of the case it appeared that James and his
wife had been married many years ; at the time of their mar-
riage neither had any property, and "their accumulations of
property of every kind were at all times owned jointly by
them." Both the Common Pleas Court and the Court of Ap-
peals held that the provision for survivorship was ineffective.
In this they were reversed by the Supreme Court.
The opinion of the court was given by Chief Justice Mar-
shall. He found a contract for survivorship between James and
Letitia, stating: "Inasmuch as the transaction was permitted
to remain undisturbed for a period of two years before the
death of James, it must be presumed that Letitia Hutchison
knew of the use of her funds, and that she was fully consenting
to the title to the stocL being taken as it was in fact taken. The
contract, therefore, fully meets the requirements of mutual-
ity." Having found that the parties intended to contract with
each other the court then found that the language used by them
in the certificate was appropriate for "each to make an irrevo-
cable grant of his undivided one-half interest in the stock to
the other, to take effect upon the death of either." This, in
the court's opinion, created in each party an undivided one-
half interest during their joint lives and a remainder in the
one-half interest of the other. This latter conclusion seems
unexceptionable if one accepts the court's finding of a contract
between the parties. The opinion favorable to the survivor
might then have been rested on the determination that the
transaction had created a valid remainder in favor of the sur-
vivor. Instead the court based the survivor's right on the
theory that the incident of survivorship would be recognized
when created by contract between the parties. This basis for
the court's conclusion is difficult to accept for two reasons.
First, no reason is apparent for requiring a contract between
the co-owners for the creation of an incident of survivorship.
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Second, there was no incident of survivorship in the case before
the court unless it is assumed that a remainder to the survivor
is the same thing as an incident of survivorship.
The requirement of a contract between the co-owners cre-
ating a right of survivorship seems to have originated with this
case. A life estate, a fee, a vested remainder, and even a
tenancy in common is as valid when created by will or gratui-
tous grant as when created pursuant to a contract. A joint ten-
ancy or contingent remainder presents no unique problem in
this regard and a contract should not be essential to its
validity. No corresponding requirement exists in other juris-
dictions or in earlier Ohio cases. In the Scobie case"" there was
no contract between the co-owners, the survivor acquired her
rights as donee and was allowed to take by the incident of
survivorship. In the earlier case of Jeffers v. Lampson,"
where, like in the Hutchison case, there was no true incident
of survivorship, a limitation in favor of the survivor of co-
owners was regarded as a valid executory limitation even
though the interests involved were created by the will of the
father of the co-owners. From the standpoint of social policy
or of legal theory it is impossible to see how the incident of
survivorship in the Scobie case or the executory limitation in
the Jeffers case is more objectionable than similar interests
created pursuant to an agreement between the co-owners. In
spite of the court's theory, it would seem that the real signifi-
cance of the contract between the co-owners in the Hutchison
case was with respect to the authority of the husband, James,
to use funds taken from a joint bank account to create the
interests in question in the stock. The finding of this authority
was as important to the creation of a life interest in the wife
as to the creation of a remainder to her as survivor. After the
" Supra, n. 41. With the Supreme Court's requirement of a contract
compare the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that a full power of disposi-
tion in the co-owners is essential for a valid incident of survivorship; such a
requirement would seem to be equally unsound. In re Estate of James Hutchi-
son, 27 Ohio L.Rep. 6z8, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 686 (1928).
5 o Ohio St. 1o (1859); and see Taylor v. Foster, 22 Ohio St. z55
(1871).
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court found a transaction sufficient to create certain interests
in the wife, the validity of those interests should have been
determined without reference to the contract as such.
The court found that the transaction resulted in a remainder
in each co-owner conditioned on his surviving the other.46
Consequently the court's disposition of the case on a theory of
an incident of survivorship indicates that the court did not dis-
tinguish between a joint tenancy in fee with the incident of
survivorship and an estate to co-owners for their lives with
remainder in fee to the survivor. It might be pointed out that
the incident of survivorship in a joint tenancy in fee could not
be a remainder because it is not preceded by a freehold estate
of less than a fee. Accordingly it would seem to be much more
like an executory estate than a remainder." Aside from nomen-
clature there are distinctions of substance between an incident
of survivorship and a remainder to the survivor of co-tenants
for life. A conveyance by a joint tenant of his portion termin-
ates the incident of survivorship as to that portion of the
estate.48 No such consequence follows a conveyance by a co-
tenant for life with remainder to survivor. A joint tenant in
fee can convey a present fee interest in his portion, a co-tenant
for life with remainder to survivor cannot convey a present fee
and in some jurisdictions he may be able to convey no more
than a life estate, the contingent remainder being inalienable. 9
46 The court said that the remainder in Letitia was vested. It does not
appear that the decision would have been any different if the court had
thought that the remainder was contingent but the court's suggestion that the
remainder is vested does not accord with the commonly accepted conception
of a vested remainder. The remainder was not in terms to Letitia but to the
survivor. During the lives of Letitia and James the survivor was of course
unascertained and so the limitation in remainder was contingent. See Gray,
The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3d ed. (i915), Sec. 9.47 A remainder may be preceded only by a life estate or an estate tail.
Simes, Law of Future Interests (1936) Vol. I, Sec. 54.
48 Supra, n. 8.
49 According to the common law contingent remainders were not alien-
able inter vivos. Simes, op. cit., Vol. III, Sec. 712. This rule has been
changed in Ohio by statute. Ohio Probate Code 1932, Sec. 10,512-4; and
see In re Estate of James Hutltisoi;, 27 Ohio L.Rep. 628; 6 Ohio L. Abs.
686 (1928).
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The marketability of the joint tenants' interests would conse-
quently be much greater than that of the interests of the co-
tenants for life. The right of a trustee in bankruptcy or of an
attaching creditor, rights as to partition, and liability for waste
differ in the joint tenancy and co-tenancy with remainder to
survivor."0 Clearly these interests differ in character as well as
in name and it is unfortunate that the court in the Hutchison
case felt obliged to justify the right of survivorship. No prob-
lem of joint tenancy was before the court and the conclusion
that there was a valid remainder in the survivor was enough
to distinguish the cases which had dealt with a right of sur-
vivorship.
The reasoning of the Hutchison case was not followed by
the Supreme Court in the next survivorship controversy pre-
sented to it. In this case, Oleff v. Hodapp,5 the question was
presented in connection with a joint account where one co-
owner had murdered the other. The survivor was a donee
beneficiary of a joint interest in the account and so on the im-
plications of the Hutchison case would not have been entitled
to take by survivorship since there was not a contract between
to In a joint tenancy a severance of the joint interest will occur when
there is a transfer to a trustee in bankruptcy or a seizure under execution,
Tiffany, Real Property (i92o), 2d ed., Vol. I, Sec. 639. On the other hand
the liability of a contingent remainder to claims of creditors will ordinarily
depend on its alienability. Simes, op. cit., Vol. III, Secs. 736-737. But see
Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11,655 which states that "vested legal interests" are
subject to execution and thereby impliedly excludes contingent interests.
Peck v. Chatfield, 24 Ohio App. 176, 156 N.E. 459 (19z7).
A joint tenant is quite commonly given power to compel partition; see
n. z5, supra. But this is not true with respect to holders of contingent future
interests. In general see Simes, op. cit., Vol. III, Sec. 665. It has been held
that the Ohio partition statute, General Code, Sec. I2,026 does not empower
even a vested remainderman to compel partition. Eberle v. Gajer, 89 Ohio
St. 118, 105 N.E. 28Z (1913).
Because of the difference in quantum of estate acts, which if committed
by a life tenant would constitute waste, may not constitute waste when com-
mitted by a cotenant in fee. Furthermore, the statutory action for waste given
to a cotenant is primarily an action for damages; Thompson, Real Property
(924), Sec. 1868; whereas a contingent remainderman would probably be
limited to injunctive relief. Simes, op. cit., Vol. III, Sec. 625. See Ohio
Gen. Code, Sec. 10,503-23.
1 i29 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
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the co-owners for the incident of survivorship. In permitting
the survivorship the court made no reference to the Hutchison
case or to the requirement of a contract between the co-owners.
It based the recognition of survivorship in a joint deposit Sec-
tion 9648 of the General Code of Ohio. This code section is in
the division and chapter of the Ohio General Code dealing
with the organization and powers of building and loan associa-
tions. There is a similar section pertaining to banks in the chap-
ter dealing with the powers and duties of the superintendent
of banks." Each of these sections authorizes a depository insti-
tution to pay funds to the survivor of joint depositors when
the deposit carries a stipulation for a right of survivorship. The
language of these provisions would seem to indicate that they
are for the protection of the depository institutions and not
intended to control the rights of the depositors as against each
other. This has been the interpretation of the sections made by
some Ohio judges"8 but there is some authority in accord with
the position of the Supreme Court. 4 On the basis of this opin-
ion in Oleff v. Hodapp, no inference can be drawn from the
joint account cases as to the probabilities of recognition of the
right of survivorship in other situations.
CONCLUSION
A co-trusteeship, whether testamentary or non-testament-
ary, presents a situation in which there is real need for an estate
with an incident of survivorship. In other situations of co-
ownership the need is not so pressing but there is a quite com-
mon desire to create interests with an incident of survivorship.
Frequently parties who seek to create a joint tenancy merely
wish to avoid making wills. It is not sufficient to point out that
52 Gen. Code, Sec. 710-120.
53 In re Estate of Morgan, z8 O.C.A. zzz (1918); and see the dissenting
opinion of Williams in Oleff v. Hodapp, 19 Ohio St. 432 at 446; see also
Opinions of the Attorney General for Ohio 1920, p. 479 and 19zi, p. 143.
" Bank v. Van Vlack, 3 I Ill. 185, I4I N.E. 546 (i9z3); and see Gors
v. Huss, io Ohio L. Abs. 173 (i93i); Re Rehfeld's Estate, 198 Mich. 249,
164 N.W. 372 (1917).
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a will would ordinarily be preferable because of its revocable
character. To avoid lawyers' fees, or the cost or delay incident
to probate, or because of an ill defined dislike of wills, people
will seek other devices for the passing of ownership on death.
To a husband and wife whose wealth consists primarily of a
parcel of real estate, a few securities, or a bank account, a joint
tenancy may be a fairly satisfactory substitute for a will. But
whether persons are motivated by a desire to avoid will making
or by some other reason if it is clear that they intended to
create an estate with incident of survivorship that intention
should be respected and made effective unless it contravenes
some social policy or some legal doctrine which is worth pre-
serving. Rules of law which serve no purpose other than to
defeat a legitimate intention of a grantor or testator cannot
be justified.
In the survivorship cases which have been presented to it,
the Ohio Supreme Court has expressed an unreceptive attitude
toward the incident by survivorship. The opinions in these cases
have not been supported by convincing reasons, nor are they
consistent with each other. The early opinions in which ex-
treme hostility was expressed, evidence a misconception of the
characteristics and social implications of a joint tenancy. Recent
opinions have not contained a repudiation of the early opinions
nor have they offered any satisfactory explanation for the
apparent lack of consistency between the earlier and later cases.
In some recent cases where an explanation might have been
expected none was offered and in one case which did not call
for any discussion of the incident of survivorship the court
purported to base a recognition of that incident on a theory
of contract between the co-owners. This added to the confusion
because this theory was not consistent with other recent cases
and because the opinion assumed that there is no difference
between an incident of survivorship and a remainder to a sur-
vivor of two tenants in common for life. In the most recent
case on the problem the Supreme Court based a recognition
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of this incident on certain statutes relating to banks and building
and loan associations. The court suggests that these statutes
were the basis of the first recognition of survivorship in joint
account situations in former cases but the statutes had not been
mentioned in those preceding cases.
No very helpful generalization can be drawn from these
opinions. On the other hand the decisions, as distinguished
from the opinions, are consistent with each other. None of the
decisions is incompatible with the recognition of the estate of
joint tenancy. All the decisions are in accord with the propo-
sition generally accepted in other jurisdictions that a tenancy
in common will be preferred to a joint tenancy as a matter of
construction, but a joint tenancy, with the incident of survivor-
ship, will be permitted where it dearly appears that such an
estate was intended. It would seem desirable for the Ohio
courts to adopt this proposition.
